This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—April 12

by Ed Whelan

1990—In Cross v. State, Florida chief justice Rosemary Barkett dissents from the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling that probable cause existed for an arrest. After Cross consented to a search of her tote bag, police found a hard baseball-shaped object wrapped in brown tape inside a woman’s slip. Having seen cocaine packaged in this manner on “hundreds of occasions” in their combined 20 years of law-enforcement experience, they then arrested Cross. Barkett’s dissent incorporates the analysis of a lower court that did not even acknowledge, much less credit, the experience of the police officers.


2005—Sitting on the Eleventh Circuit (to which she was appointed by President Clinton in 1994), Rosemary Barkett issues a solo dissent from the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc ruling (in Johnson v. Governor of Florida) that Florida’s felon-disenfranchisement law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Barkett and another Clinton appointee also dissent from the ruling that the law does not violate the Voting Rights Act.

Trump’s First Unconstitutional War

by Michael Stokes Paulsen

After a too-long unexcused absence, I hope to return to intermittent blogging for Bench Memos.  I cannot maintain the pace or intensity of Ed Whelan, the greatest legal blogger of all time.  But I will join the fracas every now and then on issues of special concern. 

Starting today: On the National Review home page today is a short article of mine entitled Trump’s First Unconstitutional War.    

The title sums up the main point: The military strikes against the Assad regime in Syria might have been morally justified. They might have been strategically and tactically sound. But they were plainly unconstitutional.  Moreover, it is dangerous to allow presidents to initiate wars on their own, in seemingly plain violation of the Constitution.  Especially this president.   An excerpt:

This act of war might be one that some are inclined to cheer. But if the principle is conceded, or the precedent set, that Trump (or any president, for that matter) can take our country to war with another — on his own, without congressional authorization, in violation of the Constitution — then there will be nothing to stop him from initiating any further wars he wants, against any foes he wants, at any time he chooses, based on his own good judgment (or lack thereof). And that should frighten Americans of all political persuasions.

Capitol Hill Event

by Ed Whelan

Tomorrow at noon, I’ll be joining Carrie Severino (of the Judicial Crisis Network) and Ilya Shapiro (of the Cato Institute) for an event in the U.S. Capitol Visitors Center titled “The Future of SCOTUS.” The event is sponsored by the Capitol Hill lawyers chapter of the Federalist Society.

This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—April 9

by Ed Whelan

2001—A Ninth Circuit panel, in an opinion by Stephen Reinhardt, rules in Doe v. Otte that application of Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act (commonly termed a “Megan’s Law”) to those whose crimes were committed before enactment of the Act violates the constitutional bar on ex post facto punishments. The Act requires sex offenders in the state to register with law-enforcement authorities, and it provides that a central registry of information about offenders will be made public. The Ninth Circuit concludes that the Act imposes criminal punishment and therefore may not be applied retroactively.

On review (styled Smith v. Doe), the Supreme Court in March 2003 reverses the Ninth Circuit by a 6 to 3 vote (with Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer in dissent). The Act, the Court determines, creates a regulatory scheme that is civil and nonpunitive. In his 39th and final argument before the Supreme Court, the attorney for Alaska, a fellow by the name of John G. Roberts, Jr., marks his last victory as an advocate.

Dana Milbank’s Unhinged Attack on McConnell

by Ed Whelan

More (beyond this post) on Dana Milbank’s vicious hit piece on Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell:

Back in November 2013, in a surprising departure from his opportunistic partisan smearing, Milbank directed some of his hyperbolic rhetoric against then-Senate majority leader Harry Reid and his fellow Democrats. By abolishing the filibuster of lower-court and executive-branch nominees, Milbank argued, Reid and company had “broken” the Senate:

If Congress wasn’t broken before, it certainly is now. What Reid and his fellow Democrats effectively did was take the chamber of Congress that still functioned at a modest level and turn it into a clone of the other chamber, which functions not at all. They turned the Senate into the House.

Milbank predicted that Senate Democrats “will come to deeply regret what they have done.”

Now that McConnell has taken the additional step of abolishing the Supreme Court filibuster, Milbank accuses him of being the man who “broke America.” This charge is ridiculous.

For starters, as Milbank recognized three-plus years ago, Reid laid the foundation for abolition of the Supreme Court filibuster. Reid and other Democrats bragged that Democrats would abolish the Supreme Court filibuster if and when the occasion arose, and Reid said that he was “fine” on Republicans doing so. When Democrats were so incredibly stupid as to force the issue on the Gorsuch nomination, what other possible choice was there?

The abolition of the nominations filibuster, through the combined actions of Reid and McConnell, doesn’t “break” the Senate, much less America. As I’ve explained (in part in points 2 and 3 here), the use of the partisan filibuster against judicial nominees is a departure from longstanding Senate practice, and the abolition of the nominations filibuster restores and protects that longstanding practice. (And, yes, I said the same thing back in November 2013.)

Further, abolition of the Supreme Court filibuster does not present any incremental threat to the legislative filibuster. The long-settled tradition of the Senate has been to treat debate over nominations and legislation very differently. The legislative filibuster owes its continued existence not to any formal obstacle that would prevent a Senate majority from abolishing it but rather to a widespread consensus that it is valuable and serves the interests of senators. Defenders of the legislative undermine their cause by wrongly insisting that there is some sort of linkage between the nominations filibuster and the legislative filibuster.

Far from being the man who “broke America,” Mitch McConnell is the man who has done more than anyone to rescue the Supreme Court. That, I suspect, is what Milbank really objects to.

Dana Milbank’s Absurd Filibuster Propaganda

by Ed Whelan

In the course of a vicious hit piece on Senate majority leader Mitch McConnell, the Washington Post’s Dana Milbank claims that “By 2013 … 79 of Obama’s nominees had been blocked by filibusters, compared with 68 in the entire previous history of the Republic.” His claim is absurdly wrong.

Let’s review Milbank’s folly:

1. By November 2013, Senate majority leader Harry Reid had filed cloture motions on 79 Obama nominees. See Table 6 of this Congressional Research Service report, along with the update in Table 1 of this CRS memorandum.

As the Congressional Research Service emphasizes in a heading in its report, “Cloture Motions Do Not Correspond With Filibusters” (underlining added):

Although cloture affords the Senate a means for overcoming a filibuster, it is erroneous to assume that cases in which cloture is sought are always the same as those in which a filibuster occurs. Filibusters may occur without cloture being sought, and cloture may be sought when no filibuster is taking place. The reason is that cloture is sought by supporters of a matter, whereas filibusters are conducted by its opponents.…

For [various] reasons [that the CRS report spells out], it would be a misuse of the following data, which identify nominations on which cloture was sought, to treat them as identifying nominations subjected to filibuster. [Pp. 2-3 (emphasis added).] 

Indeed, back in 2013, the Washington Post’s Glenn Kessler awarded three Pinocchios to similar extravagant claims that every cloture motion filed by Reid counted as a Republican filibuster. As Kessler explained, Reid “often files cloture on multiple bills or nominations at once to speed things along even if no one is slowing things down.” (Emphasis added.) Kessler also gave two Pinocchios to a tweet by Harry Reid that is very similar to Milbank’s claim.

2. It’s bad enough that anyone might confuse cloture motions with filibuster efforts, as Milbank has done in the past. But Milbank now somehow imagines that all nominations on which cloture motions were ever filed were “blocked by filibusters.”

By my quick count, the cloture motions that Reid filed on some 39 of the 79 nominees were withdrawn or mooted, and the motions on 28 others were successful, many with strong Republican support. (Only twelve of the 28 received more than 30 negative votes, and eleven of them had fewer than twenty negative votes.) All of those nominees were confirmed.

Of the eleven cloture motions that were defeated, three of the nominations were confirmed after some delay, and four others were confirmed after Democrats abolished the filibuster.

In sum, even under a very liberal account of what “blocked by filibusters” might plausibly mean, it is difficult to see how anyone could contend that more than eleven of Obama’s nominees were “blocked by filibusters.”

3. By contrast, Table 6 of the CRS report shows that 14 nominees of President George W. Bush were blocked by Democratic filibusters. Indeed, it was Harry Reid and his fellow Democrats who initiated the unprecedented use of the partisan filibuster against judicial nominees.

4. Milbank’s comparison of Obama’s presidency to the “entire previous history of the Republic” not only conflates cloture motions with filibusters. It also ignores the fact that cloture motions on nominations became allowable under Senate rules only in 1949, so there was no “history of the Republic” on cloture motions on nominations before then.

This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—April 8

by Ed Whelan

2005—A split Ninth Circuit panel, in an opinion by notorious activist judge Stephen Reinhardt, rules in a habeas case (Musladin v. Lamarque) that under clearly established Supreme Court law a defendant on trial for murder was deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury when the trial judge permitted family members of the victim (or, as Reinhardt insists on referring to him in quotes, the “victim”) to wear buttons bearing the deceased’s photograph. (The panel will later substitute in a slightly different version of its opinion.)

In 2006, a mere two months after oral argument, the Supreme Court (in Carey v. Musladin) will unanimously reverse the Ninth Circuit.

2015—Shirley, you can’t be serious!

The day after Wisconsin voters amend the state constitution to alter the method for determining who is chief justice of the Wisconsin supreme court, Wisconsin chief justice Shirley S. Abrahamson files a federal lawsuit contending that the amendment violates her constitutional rights. The legal reasoning in Abrahamson’s complaint reflects just the sort of activist nonsense that Abrahamson has been notorious for during her decades on the court.

Less than three months later, the federal judge handling the case—an Obama appointee, no less—will grant summary judgment against Abrahamson.

Twitter, Facebook, and More

by Ed Whelan

Just a reminder: If you’re interested, my Twitter handle is @EdWhelanEPPC, and my Facebook page is www.facebook.com/EdWhelanEPPC.

You’re also welcome to join my e-mail distribution list for selected posts of mine from Bench Memos and The Corner as well as my occasional essays on NRO or elsewhere. Just sign up in the “subscribe” box on the top right half of my EPPC bio page. Please note that your e-mail address will not be visible to other folks on the list.  Also, it should be a simple matter for you to remove yourself from the list any time you want.

This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—April 7

by Ed Whelan

1969—Justice Thurgood Marshall’s majority opinion in Stanley v. Georgia declares that the First Amendment forbids criminalizing the possession of concededly obscene material. Marshall blithely distinguishes away the Court’s previous categorical statements that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment. Stanley, Marshall grandiosely proclaims, is asserting “the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home.” Yep, that carefully captures what viewing obscenity is all about. (Three justices, including Brennan, decline to join Marshall’s opinion and instead separately find a Fourth Amendment basis for vacating Stanley’s conviction.)

Chicago Events

by Ed Whelan

I’ll be in Chicago on Monday, April 10, for three events, the third of which I expect to attract an audience of 41,268 or so.

At noon, I’ll be at the University of Chicago law school for an event on religious liberty with law professor Genevieve Lakier and Aaron Streett (of Baker Botts). My remarks will focus on soon-to-be-Justice Gorsuch’s record on religious liberty and how he might affect the Court.

In mid-afternoon (probably at 3:30), I’ll be at Northwestern law school for an event tentatively titled “Lessons from the Gorsuch Confirmation Battle.” Northwestern law professor Tonja Jacobi has kindly agreed to provide commentary on my remarks.

Each of these two events is sponsored by the law school’s Federalist Society chapter.

That evening, thanks to the great generosity of Mr. Streett, I’ll join him at Wrigley Field for the World Series champion Cubs’ home opener against the Dodgers.

Supreme Court Filibuster Abolished

by Ed Whelan

Oh, glorious day!

Final confirmation vote on Friday evening around 6:45.

This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—April 6

by Ed Whelan

1994—Justice Harry Blackmun announces his impending retirement after 24 years on the Court. His majority opinion in Roe v. Wade (1973) is rivaled only by Dred Scott as the worst opinion in Supreme Court history.

As one of Blackmun’s former clerks, Edward Lazarus (who described himself as “someone utterly committed to the right to choose [abortion]” and as “someone who loved Roe’s author like a grandfather”), aptly put it, “As a matter of constitutional interpretation and judicial method, Roe borders on the indefensible.” Also from Lazarus: “Justice Blackmun’s opinion provides essentially no reasoning in support of its holding. And in the [decades] since Roe’s announcement, no one has produced a convincing defense of Roe on its own terms.” (My June 2005 Senate testimony (in parts 1 and 2) presents additional criticisms, including from other supporters of legal abortion, and explains why abortion policy needs to be restored to its rightful place in the democratic political processes.)  

2016—In an Atlantic essay, lefty law professor Erwin Chemerinsky salivates over the prospect that President Obama’s hoped-for appointment of Merrick Garland to the Supreme Court would create a liberal majority that “likely would overrule” the Court’s landmark Second Amendment ruling in D.C. v. Heller and that would move the Court’s decisions dramatically leftward on a broad range of issues, including preventing any regulation of abortion, entrenching racial quotas, eliminating First Amendment protections against campaign-finance restrictions, abolishing the death penalty, and extravagantly overreading the Establishment Clause (farewell, school choice, and goodbye, In God We Trust).

And all of that is before Chemerinsky even begins briefly sketching his “dream” agenda.

Alas for Chemerinsky’s dreams, Senate Republicans will succeed in blocking action on Garland’s nomination, and Donald Trump will defeat Hillary Clinton in the presidential election seven months later.

The Washington Post Publishes the Worst Analysis Yet of Neil Gorsuch’s Confirmation Fight

by Edward Blum

The prize for the worst analysis to date about the confirmation of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the U.S. Supreme Court should be awarded to Professor Richard Hasen of the University of California–Irvine Law School. Professor Hasen’s evolution from a serious legal scholar to a partisan mudslinger is now sadly complete.

That is the only conclusion to be drawn from his April 2 Washington Post editorial, “Neil Gorsuch got where he is because of a form of affirmative action.” In it, Hasen calls Judge Gorsuch “an affirmative action baby” who did not “get where he is today solely based on his merits.” According to Hasen, Judge Gorsuch’s remarkable career is a product of Justice White’s affinity for law clerks from his home state, Justice Kennedy’s charity, political connections, and wealthy clients. To call Hasen’s charges unfounded would be more charitable than his baseless speculation deserves. But Judge Gorsuch’s sterling achievements and well-earned success at every stage of his career need no defense from me or any impartial observer.

What does merit a response is Hasen’s attempt to use his baseless speculation about Judge Gorsuch as a launching pad for a defense of affirmative action. Remarkably, Hasen’s convoluted argument makes one of the best cases against race-based preferences anyone has seen in a very long time. Hasen’s thesis is that simply by knowing the circumstances of Judge Gorsuch’s life — being a Coloradan, having a politically active mother, and representing powerful clients — one can label him an “affirmative action baby.” But these kinds of assumptions are of course what make racial preferences so pernicious. In Hasen’s view, for example, every African-American graduate from an Ivy League school is presumptively an “affirmative action baby” who did not gain admission on merit. As Hasen says: “There are often more qualified people than there are positions.” So, in his eyes, race must have played a role. Quite accidentally, then, Hasen proves Justice Clarence Thomas’s point: “These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority,” and in so doing, “undermine the moral basis of the equal protection principle.”

Furthermore, Hasen’s attempt to defend his position on originalist grounds is even more nonsensical. Serious jurists and scholars — originalists and non-originalists alike — have, and are engaged in, a thoughtful debate about whether, and to what extent, the 14th Amendment, as originally understood, allows the use of racial preferences in government programs. Hasen’s breezy assertion that “an honest originalist probably would conclude that affirmative action is consistent with the original meaning of the 14th Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as the Congress that passed the 14th Amendment also passed race-conscious affirmative action legislation,” only proves that he is neither honest nor an originalist. There is far more to the issue than that — and Hasen knows it.

Hasen then claims that it is “a deep conservatism” that led Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito “to vote to oppose race-based affirmative action, even though they are not originalists.” But Hasen appears to have bypassed a far more obvious reason: respect for judicial precedent. Justice Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson and the Court’s decision in Brown vs. Board of Education have far more in common with those who oppose race-based affirmative action than they do with those who subscribe to the amorphous “diversity” rationale. In fact, Chief Justice Roberts’s statement that “the way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race,” is reminiscent of what the plaintiffs told the Supreme Court in Brown: “no State has any authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens.” Is this what Hasen means by “deep conservatism”?

Indeed, it is striking that Professor Hasen doesn’t even try to defend the diversity rationale — the only rationale the Supreme Court has ever accepted for using racial preferences in education. Instead, he contends that race-based preferences should extend to African Americans because many of their “ancestors were slaves in the United States” and because they “are still working to overcome more than a century of discrimination once slavery ended.”

Well, as an initial matter, his candor is welcome and instructive. It is important that the Supreme Court understand that, deep down, ardent supporters of affirmative action don’t believe in the diversity rationale — it merely a means to an end for them. The Court should therefore view diversity-rationale arguments with deep skepticism.

More fundamentally, do Hasen and other progressives genuinely believe that slavery is a defense for how affirmative action is used today? Do they care that Ivy League schools are using it as cover to engage in systematic discrimination against Asian Americans — as Students for Fair Admissions has alleged in its ongoing lawsuit against Harvard? After all, Asian Americans, as Hasen puts it, also “have faced their own struggles, with many of them or their ancestors fleeing poverty or oppression.” Does it bother Hasen and the admissions administrators at dozens of elite universities that colleges are granting racial preferences mostly to affluent minorities from well-connected families instead of minorities from challenging social-economic circumstances? These are the applicants who need the “helping hand” that Hasen claims racial preferences deliver? There are many other issues that raise additional doubts about whether modern racial-preferences can withstand scrutiny even for those jurists and academics who accept them as constitutional under some circumstances. But why let nuance get in the way of an outburst against an honorable man.

Most disappointing of all, Hasen saves his worst criticism of Judge Gorsuch for last, claiming that his failure to “meet with three senators who are all women of color” adds to the “fears” about his approach “on issues of race.”

So, it has come to this.

No presumption of good faith. No offer of proof for such a serious accusation — even though they are only three of approximately 20 senators with whom Judge Gorsuch has not met. For the progressive academic, correlation is causation, and we are all guilty of racial insensitivity unless we can prove ourselves innocent.

But is Hasen willing to live by his own test? Who are the senators that Justices Kagan and Sotomayor failed to meet with? What if they were all Christian or white? Did they miss any Jewish ones? Should we make the same disreputable assumptions about them that Hasen is so eager to make about Judge Gorsuch? Of course not.

In the end, this scurrilous weaponizing of race as a debater’s tool just proves that the diversity project is a failure. After more than 40 years of experimentation with racial classifications and preferences as a means to promote reconciliation, we have less understanding and more division. We have an increased desire to make everything in life about the few things that separate us instead of the many that unite us. We’re going backwards.

Someone has a problem with race. But it is not Neil Gorsuch.

— Edward Blum, a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the president of Students for Fair Admissions.

Interview on Simple Justice Blog

by Ed Whelan

On the Simple Justice blog run by criminal-defense lawyer Scott H. Greenfield, David Meyer-Lindenberg presents a 10-question written interview of me that probably tells you much more than you’d care to know about my background and career—plus incidental mentions of Vin Scully, Don Drysdale, Bobby Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and Colonel Sanders. Here’s an excerpt in which I discuss my decision to leave private practice in 1990:

While I was on vacation in September 1990, it suddenly hit me with crystal clarity that I didn’t want to spend the rest of my life doing what I was doing. With my characteristic impatience, I then asked myself why I should do it for one second more—and I couldn’t come up with a good answer. So when I got back to the office, I informed my colleagues, to their surprise, that I had decided to leave the firm. Where would I go work? I didn’t know.

I have made three major decisions in my life that were, by conventional standards, foolish but that I’m so glad to have made. Deciding to leave Munger Tolles right on the cusp of an all-but-certain partnership, and with little idea what I would do next, was the first of the three.

The firm generously allowed me to continue working while I explored other job opportunities. I traveled back to D.C. to interview with two offices in the U.S. Department of Justice and one in the White House, but didn’t see any of those working out. I was all set to accept an offer with the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles when I received a call in early December from the head of one of the DOJ offices. I wasn’t surprised at all when he began with, “Ed, I’m sorry to say that we’re unable to make you an offer at this time.” But I nearly fell out of my chair when he immediately followed with, “But would you be interested in clerking for Justice Scalia?”

If you had asked me to set aside the constraints of reality and pick my next job, clerking for Justice Scalia would have been at the top of the list. I had interviewed for a Supreme Court clerkship with him in 1986, just after my Wallace clerkship ended and just before his Senate confirmation vote. It never crossed my mind to apply again in 1990, when I was a full five years out of law school, and even if it had, I would have assumed that he had long since completed his hiring for the clerkships beginning in the summer of 1991.

In any event, two weeks later, I interviewed with Justice Scalia and his law clerks, and this time things worked out. I owe many people for my good fortune, Judge Wallace high among them. I never did learn just how my unsuccessful application for a job at DOJ ended up in a Scalia clerkship.

Re: ‘Bastardized Charges’

by Ed Whelan

This Politico article presents a longer overlap between a passage from Neil Gorsuch’s dissertation-turned-book and a 1984 law-review article by Abigail Lawlis Kuzma than I was aware of when I wrote my initial post on this matter yesterday evening. It’s still all highly technical medical jargon and very basic facts, in contrast with ideas, arguments, or creative expressions, and Kuzma herself has rejected the charge that Gorsuch plagiarized her.

This strikes me, at worst, as the sort of inadvertent mistake that many academics make in compiling materials for book-length dissertations. More broadly, I don’t see how this dispute over 20+-year-old citations has any meaningful bearing on the overall case for Gorsuch’s nomination.

(I am also adding the content of this post as an addendum to my original post.)

Bastardized Charges

by Ed Whelan

Surprise, surprise. Another desperate 11th-hour smear, something that appears to have become a rite of passage for Republican Supreme Court nominees.

Someone (David Brock, call your office?) is shopping around to news outlets baseless claims that Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch committed acts of plagiarism in four passages in his 2006 book The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia. Multiple academics who have reviewed the charges—including one of Gorsuch’s imagined victims—have rejected those claims, which, they explain, rest on a misunderstanding of academic citation standards and don’t involve misappropriation of anyone’s ideas, theories, or creative expressions.

In what I’m told is supposedly the starkest example, the plagiarism peddler contends that Gorsuch wrongly borrowed from a 1984 law-review article when he described Down syndrome as a “chromosomal disorder that involves both a certain amount of physical deformity and some degree of mental retardation.” The article describes it as “an incurable chromosomal disorder that involves a certain amount of physical deformity and an unpredictable degree of mental retardation.” The peddler also contends that Gorsuch plagiarized when he wrote, “Esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula means that the esophageal passage from the mouth to the stomach ends in a pouch, with an abnormal connection between the trachea and the esophagus.” The article states: “Esophageal atresia with tracheoesophageal fistula indicates that the esophageal passage from the mouth to the stomach ends in a pouch, with an abnormal connection between the trachea and the esophagus.” Gorsuch cites the same underlying sources that the article does.

Abigail Lawlis Kuzma, the author of the law-review article, repudiates the plagiarism charges:

I have reviewed both passages and do not see an issue here, even though the language is similar. These passages are factual, not analytical in nature, framing both the technical legal and medical circumstances of the “Baby/Infant Doe” case that occurred in 1982. Given that these passages both describe the basic facts of the case, it would have been awkward and difficult for Judge Gorsuch to have used different language.

Georgetown professor John Keown, one of the outside examiners of Gorsuch’s Oxford dissertation on which the book was based, calls the allegations of plagiarism “unsubstantiated” and praises the book as “meticulous in its citation of primary sources.” Further: “The allegation that the book is guilty of plagiarism because it does not cite secondary sources which draw on those same primary sources is very wide of the mark.” (I’ve revised this paragraph to reflect Professor Keown’s updated remarks.)

Dr. Chris Mammen, a fellow student of Gorsuch’s at Oxford, emphasizes that the “standard practice in a dissertation is to cite the underlying original source, not a secondary source, that supports a factual statement.”

Oxford professor emeritus John Finnis, who supervised Gorsuch’s dissertation and has reviewed the charges, says that “none of the allegations has any substance or justification” and that Gorsuch’s “writing and citing was easily and well within the proper and accepted standards of scholarly research and writing in the field of study in which he was working.”

At least four other academics have reviewed and rejected the plagiarism charges. But that evidently won’t stop some newspapers from scurrilously spreading them.

(I will add in links to the quotes when they’re available online.)

Addendum (4/5): This Politico article presents a longer overlap between a passage from Neil Gorsuch’s dissertation-turned-book and a 1984 law-review article by Abigail Lawlis Kuzma than I was aware of when I wrote the above post yesterday evening. It’s still all highly technical medical jargon and very basic facts, in contrast with ideas, arguments, or creative expressions, and Kuzma herself has rejected the charge that Gorsuch plagiarized her. This strikes me, at worst, as the sort of inadvertent mistake that many academics make in compiling materials for book-length dissertations. More broadly, I don’t see how this dispute over 20+-year-old citations has any meaningful bearing on the overall case for Gorsuch’s nomination.

Harry Reid Supports Republican Abolition of SCOTUS Filibuster

by Ed Whelan

Or at least he did back in 2013. From this NTK Network article (with embedded video):

In 2013, then-Senate Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) expressed support for the possibility that Senate Republicans might eliminate the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees during a press conference following the Senate Democrats’ vote for eliminating filibusters for most lower court judges.

“Aren’t you worried Republicans will just get rid of the filibuster on the Supreme Court anyway?” one reporter asked Reid in 2013.

“Let’em do it,” Reid said. “Why in the world would we care? … If they want simple majority, fine.”

“I mean all these threats about we’re going to change the rules more, as Senator Schumer said, ‘What is the choice?’ Continue like we are or have Democracy?” Reid added.

Standing right next to Reid during his comments is current Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-NY), who is leading the Democratic effort to block Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch for political reasons.

Re: No Deal on Gorsuch Filibuster

by Ed Whelan

As I explained, I think that concerns that the absence of the Supreme Court filibuster would lead presidents to make extreme Supreme Court picks are misplaced and belied by history. But let’s assume for the sake of argument that those concerns aren’t baseless. It still would make no sense for any Republican senator to strike a deal with Democrats in which he or she would commit not to abolish the filibuster for the next nominee.

Briefly put: The power that a few Republican senators have now to strike a (foolish) deal with Senate Democrats to avoid a filibuster fight on the Gorsuch nomination is the very same power that they would have to join with Senate Democrats to defeat a hypothetical “extreme” next nominee. So why confer on Senator Schumer and other Democrats a preemptive veto on any next nominee, even if that nominee turns out to be someone you strongly support? The intelligent move is instead to hold on to the free option and exercise it only if and when you face a nominee you can’t support—that is, by voting against that nominee.

No Deal on Gorsuch Filibuster

by Ed Whelan

Why would any Senate Republicans ever agree not to abolish the filibuster on the next Supreme Court nomination in order to get Democrats to agree not to filibuster the Gorsuch nomination? The very fact that Senate Democrats have the votes to filibuster Gorsuch shows that they will filibuster any plausible next nominee. So the “deal” that some are floating would simply confer on Chuck Schumer and his fellow Democrats a preemptive veto over the next nomination. What possible sense does that make?

As I’ve explained, claims that the Supreme Court filibuster is part of Senate tradition are utterly wrong. No Supreme Court nominee has ever been defeated by a partisan filibuster. The filibuster of Supreme Court nominees was theoretically possible under Senate rules from 1789 until 1949, but never happened.* And despite the fact that any single senator has since 1949 had the power to require a cloture vote on a Supreme Court nomination, there has been a grand total of four cloture votes on the more than 30 Supreme Court nominations since 1949. In short, on an accurate understanding of the Senate’s dominant traditional practice, abolition of the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees would ensure the continuation of that traditional practice.

Abolition of the Supreme Court filibuster would not threaten the legislative filibuster, which arose and exists for its own reasons. As I’ve discussed, the long-settled tradition of the Senate has been to treat debate over nominations and legislation very differently. Ironically, by wrongly insisting that the legislative filibuster and the nominations filibuster are linked, defenders of the legislative filibuster undermine their own cause.

Concerns that abolishing the filibuster would lead presidents to make extreme Supreme Court picks are also misplaced. That didn’t happen during the long period when the filibuster was regarded as completely off the table, much less during the 160 years when it wasn’t even a formal option. The simple fact is that ordinary politics — e.g., the interest in securing a solid Senate majority, the desire for public acclaim — amply constrains a president’s discretion in selecting Supreme Court nominees.

Bottom line: NO DEAL on avoiding a filibuster.

* I have corrected a mistaken version of the pre-1949 situation.

This Day in Liberal Judicial Activism—April 4

by Ed Whelan

1939—Two weeks after President Roosevelt nominates SEC chairman (and former Yale law professor) William O. Douglas to the Supreme Court, the Senate confirms the nomination by a 62-4 vote. On the Court from 1939 until 1975, Douglas will become the longest-misserving justice in history.